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  The	  pursuit	  of	  policy	  change	  is	  an	  age-­‐old	  political	  activity	  and	  is	  often	  driven	  by	  political	  interests	  representing	  changing	  societal	  values	  and	  practices	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  legal	  status	  quo.	  	  Groups	  seeking	  change	  pursue	  their	  preferences	  in	  policy	  venues-­‐-­‐“the	  institutional	  locations	  where	  authoritative	  decisions	  are	  made	  concerning	  a	  given	  issue”	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1993,	  32)—such	  as	  legislatures,	  courts,	  administrative	  agencies,	  and,	  increasingly,	  collaboratives.	  But	  the	  question	  is:	  what	  policy	  venues	  do	  groups	  tend	  to	  choose	  and	  why?	  We	  offer	  insights	  into	  this	  puzzle	  by	  examining	  field	  burning	  policy	  in	  Washington	  and	  Idaho.	  Bluegrass	  seed	  is	  used	  for	  lawns	  and	  golf	  courses,	  and	  eastern	  Washington	  State	  and	  northern	  Idaho	  are	  major	  contributors	  to	  national	  and	  international	  markets.	  Starting	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  the	  primary	  method	  for	  ensuring	  increased	  productivity	  is	  field	  burning,	  or	  the	  burning	  of	  crop	  residue.	  Burning	  “shocks”	  plants	  into	  production,	  exposes	  them	  to	  more	  sunlight,	  and	  helps	  control	  the	  growth	  of	  weeds.	  The	  practice	  also	  minimizes	  labor	  costs	  and	  soil	  erosion,	  while	  maximizing	  profits.	  	  Without	  field	  burning,	  farmers	  replant	  every	  three	  to	  four	  years,	  whereas	  burned	  fields	  remain	  planted	  for	  six	  to	  eight	  years.	  	  Field	  burning	  also	  increases	  public	  health	  risks.	  Efforts	  to	  minimize	  the	  impact	  of	  smoke	  by	  burning	  when	  favorable	  weather	  conditions	  permit	  are	  often	  foiled	  by	  unpredictable	  wind	  patterns,	  thus	  pushing	  the	  smoke	  into	  the	  more	  densely	  populated	  urban	  areas	  of	  Spokane,	  Washington	  and	  Couer	  d’Alene,	  Idaho.	  More	  generally,	  because	  smoke	  drifts	  across	  county	  or	  state	  lines,	  efforts	  to	  regulate	  the	  practice	  by	  single	  jurisdictions	  tend	  not	  to	  work.	  The	  elderly	  and	  those	  with	  respiratory	  illnesses	  are	  affected	  most,	  with	  many	  area	  doctors	  advising	  those	  with	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asthma	  and	  cystic	  fibrosis	  to	  stay	  indoors	  or	  take	  vacations	  during	  the	  field	  burning	  season	  from	  August	  through	  October.	  	  The	  smoke	  also	  deters	  tourists	  and	  recreational	  enthusiasts	  from	  enjoying	  the	  area’s	  beautiful	  forests,	  rolling	  hills,	  streams	  and	  lakes,	  and	  abundant	  wildlife.	  By	  the	  early	  1990s,	  these	  negative	  externalities	  created	  mounting	  pressure	  for	  policy	  change	  by	  diminishing	  public	  acceptance	  of	  long-­‐standing	  policies	  that	  allowed	  relatively	  unrestricted	  field	  burning	  in	  both	  states.	  	  Environmentalists	  in	  Idaho	  and	  Washington	  seized	  on	  this	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  policy	  change,	  and	  eventually	  met	  with	  significant	  success	  in	  changing	  state	  field	  burning	  policies,	  resulting	  in	  more	  burning	  restrictions	  and	  cleaner	  air.	  	  Yet	  the	  same	  policy	  goals	  were	  pursued	  in	  different	  institutional	  venues,	  with	  environmentalists	  choosing	  the	  court	  venue	  twice	  in	  Idaho,	  while	  Washington	  advocates	  opted	  for	  collaboration	  before	  pursuing,	  with	  success,	  a	  mixed	  venue	  strategy	  employing	  a	  local	  administrative-­‐legislative	  venue	  coupled	  with	  a	  state-­‐level	  administrative	  venue.	  What	  explains	  the	  different	  venue	  choices?	  Did	  environmental	  groups,	  finding	  themselves	  blocked	  in	  certain	  venues,	  and	  per	  Schattschneider	  (1960),	  choose	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  as	  a	  way	  of	  increasing	  their	  chance	  of	  success?	  Or,	  as	  the	  Advocacy	  Coalition	  Framework	  (ACF)	  argues,	  because	  groups	  are	  often	  simultaneously	  involved	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  venues	  with	  regard	  to	  specific	  policy	  issues	  (Weible	  2007),	  did	  they	  strategically	  apply	  their	  resources	  “to	  produce	  the	  most	  policy	  benefits	  for	  the	  cost	  incurred”	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  1999,	  p.	  142)?	  Or,	  was	  the	  logic	  of	  choice	  more	  consistent	  with	  Pralle	  (2003),	  namely	  that	  internal	  group	  constraints	  deter	  groups	  from	  moving	  into	  new	  venues	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because	  “policymakers	  and	  advocacy	  groups	  have	  pre-­‐existing	  preferences	  for	  certain	  venues,…[which	  means	  that]	  [f]ailure	  in	  one	  venue,	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  opportunity	  in	  another,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  an	  advocacy	  group	  will	  shift	  venues”	  (p.	  242;	  see	  also	  Pralle	  2010)?	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  our	  comparative	  analysis	  offer	  support	  for	  both	  Schattschneider	  and	  ACF,	  but	  not	  Pralle.	  	  Finding	  themselves	  blocked	  and/or	  facing	  less	  than	  satisfactory	  outcomes	  in	  certain	  policy	  venues,	  environmentalists	  in	  both	  cases	  expanded	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict.	  They	  also	  strategically	  targeted	  their	  efforts	  at	  venues	  which	  best	  matched	  their	  political,	  legal	  and	  technical	  (informational)	  resources	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  promote	  policy	  change	  successfully.	  Yet,	  precisely	  because	  environmentalists	  were	  willing	  in	  Washington	  to	  switch	  venues	  as	  their	  coalitional	  resources	  changed,	  they	  clearly	  were	  not	  tied	  firmly	  to	  any	  pre-­‐existing	  venue	  preferences	  ala	  Pralle.	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  Idaho	  case	  we	  find	  that	  SAFE	  chose	  federal	  courts	  not	  from	  any	  predetermined	  preferences,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  rational,	  strategic	  response	  since	  they	  were	  shut	  out	  of	  other	  possible	  venues.	  More	  importantly,	  these	  cases	  highlight	  a	  key	  oversight	  in	  the	  growing	  literature	  on	  venue	  choice	  theory.	  Current	  theory	  focuses	  entirely	  on	  venue	  choice	  as	  the	  key	  to	  policy	  change	  and,	  by	  doing	  so,	  treats	  the	  “group”	  pressing	  for	  change	  as	  a	  static,	  unchanging	  entity.	  Our	  findings,	  however,	  demonstrate	  that	  successful	  policy	  change	  requires	  both	  appropriate	  venue	  selection	  and	  coalitional	  change,	  or	  alliances	  with	  others	  rich	  in	  key	  political,	  technical	  and	  legal	  resources	  lacking	  in	  the	  primary	  group	  pushing	  for	  change.	  	  This	  means	  that	  policy	  venue	  theory	  will	  benefit	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  can	  integrate	  the	  established	  lessons	  provided	  by	  Lowi	  (1979),	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namely	  that	  eventual	  success	  in	  defeating	  a	  long-­‐established	  status	  quo	  typically	  requires	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  original	  group	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  group’s	  leverage	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  opponents.	  	  
Research	  Methodology	  We	  employ	  a	  multiple	  case	  study	  design	  appropriate	  for	  research	  questions	  that	  require	  in-­‐depth	  contextual	  analysis	  to	  answer	  “how”	  or	  “why”	  a	  phenomenon	  occurs	  (Yin	  2009).	  We	  limit	  analysis	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  field	  burning,	  a	  policy	  conflict	  that	  occurred	  over	  more	  than	  ten	  years	  that	  pitted	  the	  value	  of	  public	  health	  against	  agricultural	  economic	  productivity.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  jurisdictions	  examined	  here	  –	  Eastern	  Washington	  and	  North	  Idaho	  –	  are	  geographically	  proximate	  and	  culturally	  similar,	  and	  meet	  the	  test	  of	  “similar	  cases”	  as	  posed	  by	  Gerring	  (2001):	  “The	  most-­‐similar	  research	  design	  looks	  for	  a	  few	  cases	  that	  are	  as	  similar	  as	  possible	  in	  all	  respects	  except	  the	  outcome	  of	  interest,	  where	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  vary”	  (p.	  210).1	  We	  employed	  a	  snowball	  sampling	  method	  of	  key	  stakeholders,	  and,	  in	  2008	  and	  2009	  conducted	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  35	  farmers,	  industry	  officials,	  government	  employees,	  legislators,	  journalists,	  political	  activists,	  and	  attorneys	  involved	  in	  the	  field	  burning	  controversy.	  	  We	  also	  relied	  on	  newspaper	  archives,	  archival	  data	  from	  public	  hearings,	  and	  newsletters	  from	  key	  organizations	  to	  establish	  facts	  through	  a	  method	  of	  “convergence”—when	  multiple	  sources	  confirm	  the	  same	  fact	  (Yin	  2009).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In both the Idaho and WA cases there were four of the same possible venue choices, each providing the 
opportunity for policy change: (1) courts, (2) state legislature, (3) state “administrative” agencies, and (4) 
collaboratives. Washington did offer a 5th venue in SCAPCA—the local legislative-administrative agency.  
Yet, even with SCAPCA, the State Dept. of Ecology and legislature controlled policy. 
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Idaho	  Field	  Burning	  Goes	  to	  Court	  
	  Growing	  evidence	  of	  field	  burning’s	  public	  health	  hazards	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  Safe	  Air	  For	  Everyone	  (SAFE)	  in	  2001	  and	  its	  subsequent	  clash	  with	  the	  North	  Idaho	  Farmers	  Association	  (NIFA).	  Initially	  consisting	  of	  a	  mix	  of	  public	  health	  advocates	  from	  the	  medical	  community	  (e.g.,	  Idaho	  Medical	  Association)	  and	  clean	  air	  advocates	  (American	  Lung	  Association),	  SAFE	  quickly	  added	  members	  from	  the	  Northern	  Idaho	  real	  estate	  industry	  given	  declines	  in	  property	  value	  tied	  to	  burning,	  as	  well	  as	  tourism	  interests	  and	  several	  local	  Chambers	  of	  Commerce.	  By	  2002	  SAFE’s	  membership	  had	  climbed	  to	  400	  (Olsen	  and	  Hollander	  2001).	  This	  group	  targeted	  two	  policy	  venues	  from	  2002	  to	  2006.	  
	  
Choosing	  the	  Federal	  Courts	  The	  immediate	  challenge	  for	  SAFE	  was	  that	  its	  primary	  foe,	  NIFA,	  was	  well	  integrated	  into	  Idaho’s	  political	  infrastructure	  and	  had	  made	  protecting	  field	  burning	  a	  top	  priority	  for	  decades	  (Sudermann	  1998).	  NIFA’s	  advantages	  started	  with	  Idaho’s	  well	  entrenched,	  strongly	  conservative	  politics.	  This	  meant	  that	  state	  laws,	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  favored	  agricultural	  productivity	  and	  economic	  growth	  over	  environmental	  protection	  (Powers	  and	  Barrett	  2001).	  	  Moreover,	  NIFA	  enjoyed	  financial	  leverage	  from	  self-­‐assessed	  burning	  fees,	  which	  amounted	  to	  $25,000	  annually	  (personal	  correspondence,	  11/13/12).	  	  Burning	  fees	  funded	  public	  relations	  and	  lobbying	  efforts,	  which,	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Farm	  Bureau,	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translated	  into	  considerable	  state-­‐level	  legislative	  policy	  success	  (Powers	  and	  Barrett	  2001;	  personal	  correspondence,	  11/13/12)	  and,	  ultimately,	  a	  virtual	  dominance	  of	  state-­‐level	  venues	  on	  field	  burning	  issues	  (Hedberg	  2002).	  The	  passage	  of	  strong	  right-­‐to-­‐farm	  laws	  in	  1980	  and	  2003	  that	  precluded	  nuisance	  suits	  made	  state	  courts	  inhospitable	  to	  litigation	  challenging	  agricultural	  practices,	  even	  when	  they	  infringed	  on	  human	  health.	  	  In	  the	  1980s,	  pressure	  and	  scientific	  studies	  from	  NIFA	  and	  its	  allies	  led	  the	  Idaho	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Quality	  (IDEQ)	  to	  list	  field	  burning	  as	  an	  allowable	  source	  of	  pollution	  under	  Idaho’s	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  (CAA)	  State	  Implementation	  Plan	  (SIP).	  Further,	  NIFA	  successfully	  lobbied	  to	  shift	  regulatory	  jurisdiction	  over	  field	  burning	  from	  IDEQ	  to	  the	  Idaho	  State	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  (ISDA),	  an	  agency	  designed	  to	  promote	  agriculture	  (Hedberg	  2002).	  Given	  the	  successes	  of	  pro-­‐agricultural	  forces,	  and	  their	  own	  limited	  political	  resources	  stemming	  from	  relatively	  small	  size	  and	  newness	  to	  the	  policy	  process,	  SAFE	  knew	  that	  state-­‐level	  venues	  offered	  little	  hope	  for	  policy	  change.	  	  As	  one	  member	  stated,	  “there	  was	  no	  legislative	  solution.	  	  The	  legislature	  was	  part	  of	  the	  problem”	  (interview,	  3/10/2010).	  	  The	  executive	  director	  of	  SAFE	  agreed:	  The	  Legislature	  has	  never	  taken	  the	  lead	  on	  ensuring	  public	  health,	  so	  we’ll	  continue	  to	  work	  any	  and	  all	  avenues	  that	  we	  can	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  Legislature	  understands	  the	  …	  crisis.	  	  We	  prefer	  not	  to	  go	  to	  court,	  but	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  clear	  leadership,	  we	  will	  be	  prepared	  to	  take	  that	  step	  if	  we	  have	  to	  (Hedberg	  2002).	  	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  SAFE’s	  access	  to	  legal	  talent,	  both	  in	  house	  and	  through	  allies,	  combined	  with	  the	  overall	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  federal	  courts	  venue,	  offered	  the	  highest	  likelihood	  for	  policy	  change.	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The	  federal	  courts	  were	  attractive	  for	  three	  main	  reasons.	  First,	  many	  federal	  environmental	  laws,	  especially	  those	  pertinent	  to	  field	  burning,	  offered	  stronger	  protection	  than	  Idaho	  law.	  Second,	  federal	  courts	  have	  a	  decades-­‐long	  record	  of	  codifying	  and	  strengthening	  environmental	  laws,	  and	  offering	  the	  type	  of	  access	  not	  afforded	  by	  state	  legislative	  and	  administrative	  venues	  (Epp	  1998).	  	  Finally,	  Idaho	  appeals	  go	  to	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals,	  which	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  liberal	  federal	  court,	  especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	  environmental	  litigation	  (Kagan	  2004).	  Thus,	  SAFE	  took	  to	  the	  federal	  courts	  in	  February	  2002	  alleging	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Resource	  Conservation	  and	  Recovery	  Act	  (RCRA),	  an	  act	  regulating	  hazardous	  waste.	  	  SAFE	  argued	  that	  the	  burning	  of	  crop	  residue	  (waste)	  was	  not	  being	  properly	  regulated.	  Coupled	  with	  this	  legal	  strategy,	  SAFE	  made	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  produce	  adequate	  scientific	  support	  for	  their	  position	  by	  including	  [e]xpert	  witnesses	  retained	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  grass	  residue	  met	  the	  legal	  definition	  of	  agricultural	  waste	  as	  defined	  by	  RCRA;	  that	  the	  smoke	  making	  people	  ill	  was	  in	  fact	  originating	  from	  growers’	  fields,	  and	  that	  the	  high	  particulate	  readings	  on	  air	  quality	  monitors	  were	  correlated	  with	  symptoms	  in	  the	  general	  public	  complaint	  records.	  	  Air	  modeling	  was	  done	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  clouds	  of	  smoke	  travel	  in	  the	  region….	  Agronomic	  experts	  demonstrated	  that	  Kentucky	  bluegrass	  could	  be	  grown	  for	  at	  least	  a	  four	  year	  rotation	  without	  burning	  and	  without	  drops	  in	  yields	  (SAFE	  2002).	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  SAFE,	  the	  district	  judge	  dismissed	  the	  lawsuit,	  but	  not	  without	  hearing	  oral	  arguments	  and	  establishing	  a	  record	  of	  field	  burning’s	  impact	  (Shors	  2002).	  	  Ruling	  that	  burned	  crop	  residue	  does	  not	  constitute	  hazardous	  waste	  and	  
	   9	  
that	  he	  lacked	  jurisdiction,	  the	  judge	  wrote,	  “The	  Court	  finds	  the	  burning	  of	  residue	  is	  not	  a	  ‘disposal’	  and,	  further,	  the	  residue	  is	  not	  a	  ‘solid	  waste’	  because	  it	  is	  neither	  discarded	  or	  abandoned,	  but	  instead,	  used	  as	  part	  of	  the	  growth	  process.	  	  Therefore	  RCRA	  does	  not	  apply”	  (Alkire	  2002).	  	  After	  unsuccessfully	  appealing	  this	  ruling	  to	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit,	  SAFE	  regrouped	  and	  made	  its	  next	  venue	  choice.	  	  	  
	  
Back	  to	  the	  Future	  in	  Idaho:	  Choosing	  Federal	  Courts	  Again	  SAFE’s	  loss	  did	  not	  deter	  them	  from	  choosing	  federal	  courts	  again	  in	  2006	  although	  this	  choice	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  an	  overall	  preference	  for	  litigation.	  	  After	  all,	  litigation	  is	  costly	  and	  adversarial	  and	  members	  of	  SAFE	  expressed	  doubts	  about	  litigation	  as	  a	  continued	  strategy	  (interviews	  2009).	  	  In	  the	  meantime,	  SAFE	  also	  supported	  efforts	  to	  build	  a	  stronger	  scientific	  case	  against	  field	  burning.	  	  In	  fact,	  despite	  losing	  the	  RCRA	  court	  case,	  SAFE	  built	  a	  body	  of	  evidence	  demonstrating	  the	  harmful	  impact	  of	  field	  burning.	  We	  had	  epidemiologists,	  we	  had	  toxicologists,	  …	  we	  created	  so	  much	  evidence	  for	  th[e	  RCRA	  case]….	  Getting	  the	  experts	  that	  typically	  only	  rich	  industry	  can	  afford.	  	  We	  …	  had	  the	  money	  and	  …	  did	  it	  (interview,	  10/28/2009).	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  case	  helped	  SAFE	  build	  new	  professional	  relationships	  with	  attorneys	  involved	  in	  federal	  public	  health	  litigation.	  These	  lawyers	  included	  those	  from	  the	  Sierra	  Club’s	  legal	  arm,	  Earthjustice.	  	  Having	  access	  to	  high-­‐powered	  and	  experienced	  legal	  expertise	  did	  two	  things	  that	  strongly	  influenced	  SAFE’s	  second	  venue	  decision.	  First,	  the	  appeal	  of	  the	  RCRA	  case	  “softened	  up”	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit	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and	  established	  a	  set	  of	  facts	  and	  scientific	  support	  that	  made	  it	  more	  likely	  to	  accept	  that	  field	  burning	  was	  harmful	  (interview,	  10/28/2009).	  Second,	  the	  consultation	  with	  Earthjustice	  lawyers	  led	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  a	  potential	  flaw	  in	  Idaho’s	  SIP,	  a	  new	  legal	  angle	  to	  get	  the	  controversy	  in	  front	  of	  the	  federal	  Ninth	  Circuit	  again.	  	  Due	  to	  an	  error	  while	  revising	  its	  SIP	  in	  2003,	  field	  burning	  was	  not	  officially	  articulated	  as	  an	  allowable	  source	  of	  air	  pollution	  by	  Idaho	  lawmakers	  (Smith	  2005).	  	  Lawmakers	  were	  made	  aware	  of	  this	  omission	  and	  quickly	  amended	  the	  SIP,	  which	  the	  EPA	  approved.	  	  Yet	  this	  response	  was	  deemed	  inadequate	  and	  lacking	  legality	  because,	  according	  to	  SAFE,	  EPA	  had	  violated	  the	  1946	  Administrative	  Procedures	  Act	  (APA)	  by	  failing	  to	  adequately	  consider	  the	  negative	  health	  and	  visual	  impacts	  of	  the	  “new”	  amendment	  (Smith	  2005).	  The	  appeal	  of	  EPA’s	  decision	  went	  directly	  to	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit2	  and,	  in	  2007,	  it	  ordered	  EPA	  to	  reconsider	  its	  approval	  of	  field	  burning	  in	  Idaho	  (Dukes	  2007).	  The	  decision	  forced	  farmers	  and	  grass	  growers	  to	  the	  bargaining	  table	  and,	  by	  January	  2008,	  an	  agreement	  was	  reached	  between	  growers	  and	  SAFE	  establishing	  a	  new	  smoke	  management	  program.	  The	  new	  program	  ensured	  stronger	  human	  health	  protections	  than	  federally	  mandated	  levels	  under	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  for	  the	  pollutant	  of	  chief	  concern,	  small	  particulate	  matter,	  and	  others	  such	  as	  carbon	  monoxide,	  ground-­‐level	  ozone	  (urban	  smog),	  and	  sulfur	  dioxide.	  Specifically,	  “no	  burns	  are	  allowed	  if	  any	  of	  the	  criteria	  pollutants	  under	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  are	  at	  or	  predicted	  to	  reach	  75%	  of	  federal	  levels”	  (SAFE	  2012).	  In	  addition,	  the	  agreement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The CAA allows appeals of administrative decisions to the Circuit Courts (42 U.S.C. § 7607). 
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returned	  state-­‐level	  regulatory	  jurisdiction	  from	  the	  farmer-­‐controlled	  ISDA	  to	  IDEQ,	  Idaho’s	  primary	  pollution	  control	  agency	  (Buley	  and	  Stewart	  2008).	  	   	  
Field	  Burning	  in	  Washington:	  A	  Multi-­‐Venue	  Strategy	  
	  In	  1998,	  the	  State	  of	  Washington	  became	  the	  first	  state	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Northwest	  to	  ban	  field	  burning,	  most	  all	  of	  which	  occurred	  around	  the	  eastern	  city	  of	  Spokane	  (population:	  250,000).	  Just	  like	  in	  Idaho,	  Washington	  citizens	  banded	  together	  in	  1995	  to	  form	  Save	  Our	  Summers	  (SOS)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  eliminating	  the	  practice.	  Yet,	  instead	  of	  choosing	  the	  courts,	  clean	  air	  advocates	  chose	  a	  collaborative	  venue	  first,	  before	  expanding	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  by	  selecting	  a	  two	  venue	  strategy	  that	  focused	  on	  a	  state-­‐level	  administrative	  venue	  and	  a	  local	  administrative-­‐legislative	  (elected	  board)	  venue	  in	  eastern	  Washington.	  
	  
Trying	  the	  Collaborative	  Venue	  First	  In	  Washington	  State,	  the	  Department	  of	  Ecology	  (DOE)	  exercised	  jurisdiction	  over	  pollution,	  including	  field	  burning.	  Yet	  Washington’s	  1967	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  (CAA)	  transferred	  primary	  regulatory	  authority	  for	  air	  pollution	  to	  county-­‐based	  agencies	  that	  were	  governed	  by	  executive	  boards	  made	  up	  of	  elected	  officials.	  In	  Spokane	  County	  the	  local	  air	  pollution	  agency	  was	  the	  Spokane	  County	  Air	  Pollution	  Control	  Authority	  (SCAPCA).3	  	  During	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  SCAPCA	  was	  dominated	  by	  pro-­‐field	  burning	  forces,	  chief	  among	  them	  the	  Intermountain	  Grass	  Growers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 SCAPCA was later renamed Spokane Clean Air. 
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Association	  (IGGA),	  a	  group	  financed	  through	  self-­‐assessed	  per-­‐acre	  burning	  fees	  that	  not	  only	  lobbied	  SCAPCA,	  but	  also	  made	  sure	  its	  members	  attended	  public	  meetings	  regularly	  and	  defended	  members	  against	  lawsuits	  (interviews	  2009;	  Yates	  1990).	  The	  self-­‐assessed	  “burn”	  fees	  of	  between	  $2	  and	  $3	  per	  acre	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  through	  the	  late	  1990s	  produced	  annual	  support	  for	  IGGA	  in	  the	  range	  of	  $70,000	  to	  $105,000.4	  	   Things	  began	  to	  change	  in	  1987	  when	  Spokane	  County	  violated	  federal	  CAA	  standards	  for	  small	  particulate	  matter,	  thus	  forcing	  SCAPCA	  to	  consider	  new	  regulations	  in	  1990	  that	  reduced	  the	  numbers	  of	  acres	  to	  be	  burned	  from	  roughly	  31,000	  in	  1990	  to	  18,108	  in	  year	  2000,	  and	  created	  a	  limited	  “window”	  of	  time	  for	  burning	  regardless	  of	  weather	  conditions	  (Yates	  1990).	  Over	  200	  members	  of	  the	  grass	  growing	  community	  reacted	  by	  turning	  out	  at	  public	  hearings	  to	  oppose	  the	  new	  rules,	  while	  little	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  citizens	  testified	  in	  favor	  of	  stricter	  controls	  (Bayne	  1990).	  In	  the	  end,	  IGGA	  succeeded	  in	  watering	  down	  the	  new	  rules	  by	  increasing	  the	  burning	  “window”	  by	  33	  percent,	  increasing	  the	  1990	  baseline	  to	  35,000	  acres,	  and	  allowing	  field	  burning	  to	  continue	  into	  the	  indefinite	  future.	  Such	  dominance	  in	  turnout	  at	  public	  SCAPCA	  meetings	  was	  par	  for	  the	  course.	  	  From	  the	  late	  1980s	  through	  1995,	  growers	  and	  their	  agricultural	  allies	  tended	  to	  pack	  meetings	  with	  90	  percent	  of	  all	  attendees	  in	  support	  of	  growers’	  pro-­‐field	  burning	  position	  (Steele	  1995a).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The number of acres being burned each year in the late 1980s, and the number that made it into new 
SCAPCA rules in 1990 as a baseline for policy, was 35,000 acres, on average (SCAPCA 1990; Yates 
1990). 
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   The	  rulemaking	  result	  dissatisfied	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  residents	  in	  and	  around	  Spokane,	  and	  led	  key	  stakeholders	  to	  seek	  a	  negotiated	  collaborative	  process.	  Clean	  air	  advocates	  knew	  that,	  by	  definition,	  a	  collaborative	  forum	  gave	  them	  a	  fighting	  chance	  of	  influence	  because	  its	  primary	  purpose	  was	  to	  produce	  win-­‐win,	  positive	  sum	  outcomes	  in	  which	  all	  stakeholders	  are	  made	  better	  off	  than	  before.	  Moreover,	  clean	  air	  advocates	  were	  not	  the	  only	  local	  stakeholders	  concerned	  about	  the	  negative	  effects	  posed	  by	  field	  burning.	  The	  Soil	  and	  Water	  Conservation	  Society	  (SWCS)	  led	  the	  way	  in	  1990	  with	  a	  position	  statement	  that	  decried	  how	  “[c]onflicting	  interests	  have	  become	  so	  polarized	  and	  emotion-­‐charged	  that	  it	  may	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  a	  rational	  solution,”	  while	  also	  calling	  for	  the	  “effective	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  and	  resource	  use	  problems	  arising	  from	  this	  issue”	  (SWCS	  1990,	  p.	  2).	  The	  SWCS	  was	  quickly	  joined	  by	  the	  Ag	  Forestry	  Leadership	  group	  and	  the	  Agricultural	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Spokane	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  long	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  local	  grass	  growers,	  and	  IGGA.	  	  Recognizing	  that	  “the	  grass	  seed	  industry	  is	  an	  important	  economic	  force	  in	  the	  region’s	  economy”	  and	  declaring	  “the	  need	  to	  preserve	  and	  improve	  air	  quality,”	  these	  groups	  joined	  clean	  air	  advocates,	  state	  and	  local	  agencies,	  and	  public	  health	  interests	  such	  as	  the	  American	  Lung	  Association	  (ALA),	  in	  the	  collaborative	  Inland	  Northwest	  Field	  Burning	  Summit	  that	  operated	  from	  1990	  to	  1995	  (Spokane	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  N.d.).	  	  To	  no	  one’s	  surprise	  the	  negotiations	  were	  not	  easy.	  	  One	  stakeholder	  identified	  several	  times	  where	  negotiations	  deteriorated:	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[T]oo many times, we had people walk out and throw their clipboards across the table 
and say “F___ you, I’m outta here” and one time I had to chase a guy down and I pinned 
him in the stall of the toilet … and I wouldn’t let him out (interview, AG2). 	  Despite	  the	  contentiousness,	  the	  collaborative	  effort	  reached	  areas	  of	  mutual	  agreement	  that	  served	  as	  a	  potential	  foundation	  for	  later	  compromises.	  	  By	  July	  1991,	  summit	  stakeholders	  came	  to	  an	  agreement	  limiting	  the	  days,	  location,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  acreage	  burned	  (AP	  1991).	  	  Then,	  in	  May	  1993	  stakeholders	  agreed	  on	  an	  expression	  of	  intent	  going	  forward:	  The	  1993	  INFB	  Summit	  members,	  recognizing	  that	  portions	  of	  our	  earlier	  field	  burning	  agreement	  are	  now	  dated,	  agree	  unanimously	  to	  support	  the	  principles	  embodied	  within	  that	  agreement	  and	  to	  actively	  pursue	  as	  a	  group	  and	  individually	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  eliminating	  grass	  burning	  by	  the	  development	  of	  practical	  alternatives	  that	  will	  allow	  continued	  production	  of	  grass	  seed	  (INFB	  Summit	  1993).	  	  	  Acreage	  caps	  on	  burning	  were	  finally	  established	  after	  summit	  participants	  acknowledged	  that	  smoke	  from	  field	  burning	  contributed	  to	  major	  air	  pollution	  problems	  in	  Spokane,	  especially	  small	  particulate	  matter	  (Steele	  1994).	  By	  August	  1994,	  however,	  the	  coalition	  and	  its	  collaborative	  agreements	  began	  unraveling.	  	  The	  ALA	  chapter	  announced	  its	  intention	  to	  quit	  the	  summit	  because	  it	  was	  settling	  for	  “amelioration,”	  not	  a	  “fixed	  plan	  to	  …	  stop	  …	  burning.	  To	  tolerate	  this	  …	  is	  unacceptable	  (ALA	  1994).	  	  For	  their	  part,	  many	  growers	  found	  the	  newly	  imposed	  acreage	  limits	  and	  “window”	  for	  burning	  too	  restrictive	  and	  costly.	  	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  collaborative	  effort	  was	  hastened	  with	  the	  1994	  mid-­‐term	  elections	  that	  produced	  a	  Republican	  takeover	  of	  the	  Washington	  House	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of	  Representatives	  and	  a	  near	  takeover	  of	  the	  Senate.	  Growers	  abandoned	  the	  local	  collaborative	  effort	  to	  seek	  out	  a	  state-­‐based	  legislative	  solution	  more	  to	  their	  liking,	  which	  they	  did	  in	  1995	  by	  statutorily	  limiting	  SCAPCA’s	  power	  to	  put	  limits	  on	  the	  number	  of	  days	  growers	  could	  burn	  (Camden	  1995).	  	   	  
Targeting	  Local	  and	  State	  Venues	  Simultaneously	  The	  new	  legislation	  ignited	  an	  organized	  public	  backlash	  against	  field	  burning	  and	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  SOS,	  a	  grassroots	  Eastern	  Washington	  group,	  in	  1995.	  	  SOS	  described	  its	  founding	  and	  mission:	  	  [We]	  believe	  that	  this	  region	  should	  be	  a	  beautiful	  and	  healthy	  place	  for	  all	  of	  us	  to	  breathe	  and	  raise	  our	  children.	  	  We	  were	  created	  …	  after	  the	  bluegrass	  industry	  …	  persuaded	  legislators	  …	  to	  further	  de-­‐regulate	  grass	  burning	  by	  stripping	  local	  air	  pollution	  control	  authorities	  of	  their	  powers	  to	  limit	  …	  burning	  (SOS	  1996).	  	  Ramping	  up	  quickly	  with	  over	  500	  members,	  SOS	  challenged	  the	  grass	  growers	  simultaneously	  in	  two	  different	  venues.	  	  
A	  Local	  Legislative-­‐Administrative	  Venue.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  two-­‐pronged	  venue	  strategy	  matched	  their	  primary,	  yet	  localized	  strength	  of	  mobilized	  citizens	  with	  the	  increasingly	  contested,	  and	  therefore	  increasingly	  accessible,	  SCAPCA	  venue.	  A	  new	  SCAPCA	  Director	  in	  1993	  and	  a	  newly	  elected	  board	  member	  in	  1995,	  both	  sympathetic	  to	  SOS’s	  public	  health	  concerns,	  along	  with	  a	  five-­‐fold	  increase	  in	  citizen	  complaints	  in	  1995,	  helped	  turn	  the	  tide.	  	  The	  rapid	  erosion	  of	  growers’	  dominance	  was	  also	  evident	  by	  the	  turnaround	  in	  the	  mix	  of	  attendees	  at	  SCAPCA’s	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meetings.	  Instead	  of	  90	  percent	  favoring	  growers,	  meetings	  from	  1995	  through	  1997	  contained	  80	  to	  90	  percent	  attendees	  against	  field	  burning	  (Steele	  1995a).	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  SOS	  started	  gathering	  medical/health	  harm	  data	  from	  field	  burning,	  and	  cultivated	  support	  from	  Spokane’s	  large	  medical	  community	  and	  the	  ALA.	  SOS	  won	  medical	  community	  support	  for	  a	  burn	  ban	  because	  “physicians	  …	  serving	  patients	  in	  the	  area	  …	  believed	  that	  …	  the	  scientific	  information	  showed	  that	  the	  smoke	  was	  a	  hazard….	  One	  physician	  …	  surveyed	  the	  [Spokane	  County	  Medical	  Society]	  [as]	  to	  whether	  grass-­‐burning	  smoke	  was	  a	  health	  problem….	  	  [O]f	  600	  members,	  580	  responded,	  yes,	  it	  was”	  (McLeod	  2005).	  SOS’s	  choice	  of	  the	  local	  administrative-­‐legislative	  venue	  was	  was	  instrumental	  in	  a	  3	  –	  2	  vote	  by	  SCAPCA	  in	  December	  1995	  to	  phase-­‐out	  field	  burning	  completely	  in	  Spokane	  County	  by	  2002	  (Steele	  1995b).	  	  
	  A	  State	  Level	  Administrative	  Venue.	  The	  overarching	  role	  played	  by	  Washington	  State’s	  Department	  of	  Ecology	  (DOE)	  in	  air	  pollution	  matters,	  the	  blockage	  of	  the	  state	  legislative	  venue	  by	  growers	  and	  their	  Republican	  allies,	  and	  the	  push	  by	  the	  Clinton	  Administration	  EPA	  to	  rewrite	  the	  rules	  for	  small	  particulate	  matter,	  led	  SOS	  to	  start	  building	  a	  relationship	  with	  DOE	  in	  1995.	  	  The	  goal:	  to	  persuade	  DOE	  to	  further	  restrict	  and	  ban	  field	  burning	  in	  Washington	  State.	  The	  choice	  of	  DOE	  also	  made	  sense	  to	  SOS,	  along	  with	  ALA	  and	  the	  Spokane	  medical	  community,	  two	  groups	  with	  considerable	  scientific	  resources	  ,	  because	  they	  believed	  science	  was	  on	  their	  side	  (interview,	  01/20/2009).	  The	  science	  against	  field	  burning	  found	  additional	  support	  in	  several	  EPA-­‐recognized	  Harvard	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epidemiological	  studies	  demonstrating	  the	  link	  between	  mortality	  and	  exposure	  to	  particulate	  matter	  (Schwartz,	  et	  al.	  1996;	  interview,	  02/22/2010).	  	  The	  choice	  of	  DOE	  as	  a	  venue	  was	  also	  attractive	  to	  SOS	  because,	  of	  all	  the	  environmental	  and	  natural	  resources	  agencies	  in	  Washington,	  DOE	  had	  the	  strongest	  reputation	  as	  a	  supporter	  of	  public	  health	  values	  (interview,	  01/20/2009).	  	   The	  decision	  to	  work	  at	  both	  the	  local	  level	  and	  with	  DOE	  started	  paying	  dividends	  in	  1996.	  	  After	  the	  new	  SCAPCA	  phase-­‐out	  rules	  in	  December	  1995,	  growers	  asked	  DOE	  to	  strip	  SCAPCA	  of	  its	  regulatory	  authority	  over	  burning	  and	  to	  craft	  new	  statewide	  rules	  protecting	  field	  burning	  (Steele	  1996a).	  	  Yet	  DOE	  officials	  resisted,	  concluding	  that	  the	  growers,	  by	  doing	  an	  end	  run	  to	  the	  legislature	  around	  the	  earlier	  collaborative	  bargaining	  effort,	  had	  acted	  in	  bad	  faith.	  More	  important	  was	  that	  the	  new	  scientific	  evidence	  brought	  to	  bear	  by	  SOS	  and	  its	  allies,	  which	  linked	  fine	  particulate	  matter	  to	  poor	  human	  health	  outcomes,	  was	  becoming	  impossible	  to	  ignore.	  A	  DOE	  official	  noted	  that	  “as	  we	  got	  better	  science	  about	  the	  consequences	  were	  [of	  field	  burning,]	  that	  …	  added	  momentum	  and	  courage	  to	  …	  agency	  [decision-­‐makers]”	  (interview,	  02/22/2010).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  DOE	  supported	  SCAPCA’s	  decision	  to	  phase	  out	  burning	  and	  imposed	  a	  120-­‐day	  emergency	  field-­‐burning	  moratorium	  in	  late	  March	  1996	  (Steele	  1996a).	  	  Later	  in	  1996,	  DOE	  officially	  phased	  out	  the	  statewide	  practice	  of	  field	  burning	  (Steele	  1996b),	  and	  DOE	  banned	  the	  practice	  statewide	  in	  1998	  after	  a	  Washington	  State	  University	  study	  concluded	  that	  the	  public	  health	  costs	  of	  burning	  outweighed	  the	  economic	  benefits	  (Holland	  et	  al.	  1997).	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Conclusion	  Environmental	  advocates	  in	  Washington	  and	  Idaho	  met	  with	  significant	  success	  in	  changing	  state	  policies	  associated	  with	  field	  burning.	  In	  each	  case,	  however,	  environmentalists	  and	  their	  allies	  chose	  different	  policy	  venues.	  The	  question	  is	  why?	  	  In	  both	  cases	  there	  is	  strong	  support	  for	  Schattschneider’s	  (1960)	  finding	  that	  interest	  groups	  will	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  when	  particular	  policy	  venues	  are	  inhospitable	  to	  their	  demands.	  	  Yet,	  this	  analysis	  also	  shows	  that	  groups	  strategically	  match	  their	  political,	  legal,	  and	  technical	  resources	  to	  the	  appropriate	  venue	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  success	  in	  the	  new	  venue.	  	  In	  Idaho,	  state-­‐level	  venues	  across	  the	  board	  were	  dominated	  by	  grass	  growers,	  along	  with	  their	  agricultural	  and	  industry	  allies.	  Thus	  it	  made	  sense,	  especially	  given	  SAFE’s	  access	  to	  legal	  resources	  and	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  federal	  courts,	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  to	  the	  federal	  level.	  In	  Washington	  State,	  the	  story	  is	  the	  same.	  The	  lack	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  regional	  collaborative	  forum	  led	  environmentalists	  to	  expand	  the	  conflict	  to	  two	  different,	  new	  venues	  that	  were	  a	  good	  match	  for	  their	  increasing	  political	  and	  technical	  resources.	  These	  results	  are	  contrary	  to	  Pralle	  (2003)	  because	  the	  overall	  goal	  of	  policy	  change	  in	  both	  Washington	  and	  Idaho	  clearly	  overwhelmed	  any	  constraining	  effect	  imposed	  by	  ideology	  or	  culture.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  in	  Washington	  when	  SOS	  generated	  greater	  political	  support	  from	  the	  public	  health	  community	  and	  was	  able	  to	  press	  their	  demands	  on	  a	  local	  legislative-­‐administrative	  venue	  designed	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  popular	  demands	  and	  a	  state	  administrative	  agency	  that	  was	  more	  responsive	  to	  the	  mobilization	  of	  scientific	  evidence.	  The	  Idaho	  case	  also	  supports	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this	  logic	  through	  the	  interview	  data	  from	  key	  case	  participants,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  testimonial	  from	  SAFE’s	  Executive	  Director’s	  that	  “we’ll	  continue	  to	  work	  any	  and	  all	  avenues	  …	  if	  we	  have	  to”	  (Hedberg	  2002).	  In	  sum,	  the	  cases	  illustrate	  how	  interests	  view	  and	  strategically	  react	  to	  the	  larger	  institutional	  context	  when	  shopping	  for	  a	  policymaking	  venue	  most	  conducive	  to	  their	  policy	  goals	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  1999).	  	  	  These	  cases	  also	  demonstrate	  that	  any	  story	  of	  policy	  change	  is	  incomplete	  without	  understanding	  the	  importance	  of	  coalitional	  change.	  	  SAFE’s	  ability	  to	  expand	  its	  coalition	  and	  resource	  base	  through	  new	  working	  relationships	  with	  Earthjustice	  lawyers	  and	  outside	  medical	  experts	  figured	  centrally	  in	  their	  second,	  successful	  use	  of	  the	  federal	  courts.	  Nor	  is	  the	  story	  of	  policy	  change	  in	  Washington	  complete	  without	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  coalitional	  resources	  and	  allies.	  The	  new	  scientific	  evidence	  from	  EPA/Harvard	  studies	  and	  the	  Spokane	  medical	  community	  linking	  fine	  particulate	  matter	  to	  poor	  human	  health	  outcomes	  allowed	  SAFE	  access	  to	  and	  influence	  in	  Washington’s	  Department	  of	  Ecology,	  while	  the	  successful	  mobilization	  of	  citizens	  was	  critical	  to	  change	  at	  the	  local	  administrative-­‐legislative	  forum	  (SCAPCA).	  	  Seen	  from	  this	  perspective,	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  venue	  choice	  research	  can	  be	  enriched	  if	  it	  expands	  its	  vision	  to	  focus	  on	  actual	  policy	  change	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  changing	  coalitions	  and	  resources.	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